

《論文》

ASEAN-Plus-One Free Trade Agreements and Their Trade Effects

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1. Introduction

According to the list of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force presented by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the total 273 RTAs in the list contain the 75 RTAs covering Asian economies, and the 72 RTAs out of them were in force since the 2000s.⁽¹⁾ In this manner, RTAs including free trade agreements (FTAs) have become acceleratingly prevalent since the early 2000s, in particular, in Asian area. In this context, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a core role in forming FTAs. ASEAN itself initiated the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, and has extended its framework by adding up plus-one economies: ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA, effect in 2004), ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA, effect in 2007), ASEAN-Japan FTA (AJFTA, effect in 2008), ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA, effect in 2010), and ASEAN-India (AIFTA, effect in 2010). In addition, the comprehensive RTAs among ASEAN and the six countries above, named Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), is under negotiation at present.

This trend has also encouraged a number of studies concerning the economic impacts of FTAs on foreign trade. When it comes to the issues on the FTA effect on trade flows, the

central question has been about whether FTAs have “trade creation” and/or “trade diversion” effects, since Jacob Viner (1950) argued on these effects for the first time. The trade creation occurs when joining a FTA leads to replacement of high-cost domestic production by imports from within the FTA members. Under this case, the trade is increased and/or created within member countries. The trade diversion, on the other hands, takes place when joining a FTA leads to replacement of cheap imports from outside the FTA members by more expensive imports from inside. Under this occasion, the trade is reduced and/or even eliminated with non-members. In practice, both trade creation and diversion effects take place due to the FTA formation, and which effects are dominant is a crucial question.

For evaluating the trade effects of FTAs in *ex post* manner, a number of empirical studies have estimated the “gravity trade model”. Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) were the first to apply the “Newton’s Law of Gravitation” to international trade flows. In its original form, the gravity equation explains bilateral trade flows by the economic size of two countries and the distance between them. Since Anderson (1979) assigned the model with theoretical underpinnings for the first time, the gravity trade model has been established as being consistent with theories of trade based upon

models of imperfect competition and with the Heckscher-Ohlin model (see, e.g. Helpman and Krugman, 1985; and Deardorff, 1998). The model has often provided a useful tool to assess the trade-integration effects of regional economic ties such as FTAs. The intensity of the trade-integration caused by FTAs is usually measured by the coefficients of dummy variables, which are added in the gravity trade equation for the FTA partners during the FTA-in-force period. A positive and statistically significant coefficient for the dummy shows that the trade flows exceed the normal level predicted by the country's economic sizes and the distance between them, thereby implying an intensive trade-integration effect caused by the FTA.

Looking at the empirical literature, even after forty years of gravity equation estimates of the effect of FTAs on trade flows, there seemed no clear and convincing empirical evidence, until Baier and Bergstrand (2007) presented a thorough empirical analysis on the FTA treatment effects.⁽²⁾ They pointed out that trade policy is not exogenous variable, and addressed econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs: the FTA dummy variable is correlated with the error term. They argued that standard cross-section techniques using instrumental variables and control functions did not provide stable estimates of the FTA effects in the presence of endogeneity, and instead utilized a theoretically-motivated gravity equation using panel data with fixed effects. They finally found that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after ten years, i.e., seven times the effect estimated using the standard cross-section techniques.

Following the econometrical methodologies of Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Urata and Okabe (2014) examined the impacts of RTAs including FTAs on trade flows, with a particular focus on their trade creation and diversion effects. They

estimated the gravity trade equation covering 67 countries/regions for 27 years from 1980 to 2006 at a disaggregated level of 20 products. Their estimation addressed the problem of the RTA-endogeneity bias and zero trade flows by applying the panel-data analysis with fixed effects and the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model as its estimating technique. Their main findings were as follows: plurilateral RTAs produce trade creation for many more products compared with bilateral RTAs; RTAs among developed countries generate trade creation for a half of all products but not trade diversion for most of products, whereas RTAs among developing countries give rise to trade diversion for many more products?probably due to high tariffs imposed on imports from non-members by developing countries. Regarding the literature on empirical studies of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs, Yang and Martinez-Zarzoso (2014) estimated the effect of China-ASEAN FTA using gravity equation in agricultural and manufactured products with three dummies: (1) trade creation dummy within bloc, (2) export creation between intra- and extra-bloc, and (3) trade diversion between intra- and extra-bloc. They found trade creation effect not only within ASEAN but also for China-ASEAN FTA on the whole and positive export creation effect on the exports of agriculture and major manufactured products.

This article aims to examine the trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model for the recent two decades between 1993 and 2013. The estimation, as in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Urata and Okabe (2014), applies the panel-data with fixed effects to clear the FTA-endogeneity problem. The main contribution of this article, which Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Urata and Okabe (2014) did not cope with, is to investigate an individual trade effect of each

of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs: ACFTA, AKFTA, AJFTA, AANZFTA and AIFTA, by utilizing the updated trade data towards 2013. The empirical outcomes on the trade effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs might also provide some implication for the ongoing negotiation of RCEP framework covering all the countries related with ASEAN-plus-one FTAs. The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the backgrounds and issues in the formation of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs. Section 3 presents empirical analyses containing methodology, data, and estimation results. The last Section summarizes and concludes.

2. Backgrounds and Issues of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs

This section describes the backgrounds and issues in the formation of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs as follows.

2.1 Backgrounds

ASEAN consists of ten countries. Five founding countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) signed a framework for regional economic growth and peace and stability in 1967, which was manifested in Bangkok Declaration. According to the World Bank (2000), the motivations for regional economic integration can be divided into political and economic perspectives. Political motivations are regional security, bargaining power, project cooperation, lock-in to reform and lobbying for integration, while economic ones are towards competition, scale economy, trade creation/diversion and locational effects. The motivations of ASEAN were arguably politics because ASEAN's inaugural purpose was to blockade the spread of Chinese Communism through regional economic development. Economic cooperation was rather

a supporting role and of a second degree importance after political one. Low economic dependence with each other, competitive nature of the economies and uneven economic development of the members continuously set the tone for weak economic cooperation of ASEAN. Before mentioning ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs, brief sketch of how ASEAN has evolved would be helpful.

2.1.1. 1st Stage Widening

The founding five members were at economically developing stages, except Singapore, mainly dependent on endowed resources. Recognizing lack of political power due to the limited number and size, neighboring countries were encouraged to participate in ASEAN. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984 followed by Viet Nam in 1996, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and finally Cambodia joined in 1999. The ambition for the bigger ASEAN was expressed in 1997 ASEAN Summit.

2.1.2. Deepening

As mentioned above, the depth and scope of economic cooperation of the ASEAN was rather limited and weak from the beginning. Rivalry nature of the economies of members constrained active engagement of the members. Members agreed to lower their tariffs only on less ambitious array of commodities, and the implementation was still far from satisfactory. To deepen mutual cooperation, AFTA in goods came into surface in 1992. The end of the Cold War has weakened the political zeal for regional solidarity, while the economic recession in the region during 1980s gathered strong push for furthering the economic cooperation.

External factors expedited the economic cooperation of ASEAN: (1) the Plaza Accord made Japanese firms invest actively in the ASEAN, and accordingly the Japanese firms

wanted free movements of resources and goods across ASEAN member countries, (2) the rise of China also rendered more serious economic cooperation.

In 2007 Cebu Declaration, ASEAN set the goal for the ASEAN Economic Community by 2016, similar to European Community in some sense, to embrace for the diversity and to go far beyond simple political and economic cooperation.

2.1.3 2nd Stage Widening (ASEAN-Plus-One)

Among much literature on the backgrounds for ASEAN-Plus-One, Kleimann (2013) and Estrada et al. (2014) are comprehensive. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the ASEAN short of capitalizing on economic scales and opportunities and of exercising political powers, ASEAN stepped forward to expand the realm of economic cooperation beyond ASEAN.

The contagion effect during the Asian financial crisis rendered the separation of Northeast Asia from Southeast Asia blurred, which made the countries of ASEAN and non-ASEAN widen their cooperation to embrace each other. Sluggish movement of multilateral trade negotiations, notably the WTO, and the fear against imminent creation of the blocs in Europe and America, pressured further for the economic cooperation of wider region (Estrada et al. 2014). Being historical and natural trading partners, Japan, Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand and India were the partners to conclude economic cooperation agreement with ASEAN. Chinese early harvest FTA with ASEAN took effect in 2004, Japan did in 2008, Korea did in 2007 and India and Australia-New Zealand did in 2010. According to the ASEAN Secretariat, as of 2013, ASEAN is the 7th largest economy in the world with a combined GDP of USD 2.4 trillion and with 625 million population.

2.2 Issues of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs

2.2.1 Politically motivated FTA

Political motivation together with economic one played a role in ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs. Japan expanded huge foreign direct investment in ASEAN in reaction to the appreciation of Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord. As a result, deep and wide Japanese production network sprawled out in ASEAN area. China was antsy about Japanese stronghold in ASEAN, which has historical ties with China. Against this background, China came into an action to conclude FTA. Japan reacted to China with its own FTA with ASEAN and Korea also joined the race.

2.2.2 No deep market access

The political motivation behind ASEAN-Plus-One FTA limited the level of the market access, the most important part of integration agreements. Some country specificities also determined the degree of FTAs. With ten diverse members, ASEAN is not in position to drive proactive opening policy. China did not prefer tight binding with foreign countries and India was cautious and not ready to open wide externally, too (Kleimann, 2013). ASEAN did not feel comfortable with huge China and India. Japanese and Korea FTAs with ASEAN are also basically circumscribed by plurilateral political setting of ASEAN.

2.2.3 Limited scope of coverage

Plurilateral heterogeneity resulted in a rather smaller range of cooperative areas. Smaller areas of WTO-plus and WTO-extra were included in ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs than world average (Kleimann, 2013). The narrow common denominator of ASEAN members regarding the concession led to the shallow opening of the market.

2.2.4 Low trade intensity

During 2000-2011, ASEAN total trade in 2011 increased 3.1 times compared with trade in 2000, which is equivalent to an annual growth rate of 11.0%. Intra-ASEAN trade in 2011 increased 3.5 times compared with year 2000, which is 12.1% growth rate per annum during the same period, which is larger than the annual growth rate of extra-ASEAN trade (3.0 times and 10.6% annual growth) (See Table 2). The share of intra-ASEAN trade in overall ASEAN trade has increased from 22.0% in 2000 to 24.5% in 2013, while the share of extra-ASEAN trade has decreased from 78.0% to 75.5% during the same period. Increase in import is larger than increase in exports, and intra-ASEAN imports are greater than extra imports.

Even if the internal trade seems to increase relatively higher, the share of internal trade is less than thirty percent, which is small compared with EU, NAFTA and other FTAs.

2.2.5. ASEAN and ASEAN-Plus-One-FTAs are trade diverting?

From simple statistics in Table 1, ASEAN seems to have diverted trade from extra-ASEAN to intra-ASEAN. Considering the growing nature of ASEAN, the trade diversion effect seems to reinforce itself. It needs a lot of capital goods, parts and components imported from extra-ASEAN, which means ASEAN is inherently not prone to divert trade, more specifically import diversion.

Three more points as follows add to less-likely trade diversion effect of ASEAN. First, ASEAN must import the necessities, notably raw materials. ASEAN's trade at the product level reveals high dependency on certain sources. In 2013, ASEAN Secretariat emphasized ASEAN's high import dependency on certain countries. For example, Australia and New Zealand are major import source for meat and wool and India supplies peanut oilcake. The high dependency of ASEAN on extra ASEAN in certain areas must

Table 1 ASEAN Trade Flow (2000-2011, Billion U.S. dollars)

	2000	2005	2010	2011	2011/ 2000	Annual Growth (%)
ASEAN Total Trade	759.1	1224.9	1998.2	2386.6	3.1	11.0
ASEAN Total Exports	410.2	648.2	1,051.1	1,237.8	3.0	10.6
ASEAN Total Imports	349.0	567.7	950.0	1,148.9	3.3	11.4
Intra ASEAN Trade	166.8	304.9	548.4	584.3	3.5	12.1
Intra ASEAN Exports	93.4	163.9	295.4	309.7	3.3	11.5
Intra ASEAN Imports	73.5	141	253	274.6	3.7	12.7
Extra ASEAN Trade	592.3	920	1449.7	1802.3	3.0	10.6
Extra ASEAN Exports	316.8	484.3	752.7	928.1	2.9	10.3
Extra ASEAN Imports	275.5	435.7	697.0	874.3	3.2	11.1

Source: ASEAN Homepage, compiled by the authors

Table 2 FDI Flows from Extra-ASEAN (Million U.S. dollars)

	2000	2005	2007	2009	2010	2010/2000	Annual Growth
Intra ASEAN	762	4,060	9,626	5,271	12,279	16.1	32%
FDI from Extra	22,779	36,654	66,025	32,995	63,929	2.8	10.9%
By Sector						Sum (05-10)	Share
Agro, Fishery and Forestry		156	454	-38	92	1058	0.4
Mining and Quarrying		2,935	4,135	4,426	3,953	21209	7.4
Manufacturing		13,659	20,387	17,633	17,656	94863	33.2
Construction		17	305	519	470	1912	0.7
Financial		5,713	12,682	4,755	15,083	58600	20.5
Real Estate		850	6,805	3,668	9,329	26825	9.4
Others		12,215	19,687	1,405	15,986	74060	25.9
Unspecified		1,123	1,563	597	1,299	7390	2.6
TOTAL		36,666	66,016	32,966	63,867	285913	100.0

Source: ASEAN Homepage, compiled by the authors

maintain the extra ASEAN imports, at least hinder trade diversion from extra- to intra-ASEAN. Second, ASEAN is an active host of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Table 2 shows that it receives FDI from extra-ASEAN as almost six times as much from intra-ASEAN. Even though FDI from intra-ASEAN has been on the increase, the magnitude of it pales that of extra-ASEAN. Manufacturing sector has been a prime recipient of FDI and financial area and mining follows. Third, income growth may have induced imports from external sources. In order to figure trade creation and trade diversion effect, we need to take the wealth effect into account.

By considering the issues above and with the best available data, the next section will statistically examine the trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model.

3. Empirics on Trade Effects of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs

This section focuses on the empirical analysis of the trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model. We first clarify the methodology and data, and then represent the estimation outcomes and discuss them.

3.1 Methodology

We herein adopt a theoretically-motivated gravity trade model using panel data with bilateral fixed effects and multilateral time-varying price resistance terms. The equation for estimation is specified as follows.

$$\ln [X_{ijt} / (GDP_{it} GDP_{jt})] = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 FTAC_{ijt} + \alpha_2 FTAD_{ijt} + \alpha_3 D_{ij} + \alpha_4 rex_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

where X_{ijt} is the value of the merchandise trade flow from exporter i to importer j , GDP_{it} (GDP_{jt}) is the level of nominal gross domestic product in country i (j), D_{ij} is a bilateral dummy variable between i and j , rex_{ijt} is a bilateral real exchange rate in the logarithm, and ε_{ijt} is an error term. We also insert the time dummy from 1993 to 2013. Regarding the FTA effects on trade flows, the equation includes two kinds of dummy variables as in Urata and Okabe (2014). $FTAC_{ijt}$, a variable for denoting trade creation effect, takes a value 1 if both importer and exporter belong to the same FTA and 0 otherwise, and $FTAD_{ijt}$, a variable for denoting trade diversion effect, takes a value 1 if the importer is a member of the FTA, but the exporter is not and 0 otherwise, respectively. From the concept of trade creation and diversion effects we described in the introduction, the sign of the coefficient, α_1 , is expected to be positive, while α_2 is expected to be negative.

To address the FTA-endogeneity bias, the equation includes a bilateral dummy variable between i and j , D_{ij} . Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argued that the FTA is not exogenous variable but is influenced by considerable unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity among country pairs such as policy-related barriers (that also affects trade volume), and that this omitted variable bias is the major source of endogeneity facing estimation of FTA effects in gravity equations using cross-section data. They examined the validity of cross-section techniques using instrumental variables and control functions, but concluded that these techniques were not reliable enough to provide stable estimates of the FTA effects, and that the unobserved time-invariant bilateral variables were best controlled by using bilateral “fixed effects” in the gravity equation using panel data.⁽³⁾ There would be another potential endogeneity bias created by

simultaneity: GDP is a function of net exports. Although the simultaneity bias is considered to be not so large in the literature, the specification above has GDPs on the left hand side.⁽⁴⁾

The specification includes a bilateral real exchange rate, rex_{ijt} , to account for the theoretically -motivated multilateral time-varying price resistance terms. The gravity trade model suggested by recent formal theoretical developments requires the multilateral price variables. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggested the use of country-specific fixed effects as the method for accounting for multilateral price terms in cross section. In a panel setting, however, the multilateral price terms would be time-varying. One way to control for price changes is to introduce, similarly to Rose (2000) and Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010), the bilateral real exchange rate that varies over time and tracks price changes, the coefficient of which is expected to have a negative sign.

We introduce lagged effects of FTAs on trade, since FTA is in general “phased-in” for some years and terms-of-trade changes caused by FTA also tend to have lagged effects on trade. Although Baier and Bergstrand (2007) supposed around a ten-year lagged period, we include lagged effects by three years, since all the ASEAN-plus-one FTAs were just in force within these ten years. ACFTA was in force in January 2004 and thus its dummy takes value 1 from 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, AKFTA in force in June 2007 and its value 1 from 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, and AJFTA in force in December 2008 and its value 1 from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. AANEFTA and AIFTA came into force very recently, in January 2010, and their dummies take value 1 only from 2010 with no lags.

Some of the studies on gravity trade model encounter the treatment of zero trade flow values, as Urata and Okabe (2014) applied the

Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model to cope with it. This study, however, deals with total values of trade flows of selected major countries, which do not include zero values.

3.2 Data

The sample period is from 1993 to 2013. The reason why we choose 1993 as its starting year is that the FTA within ASEAN named AFTA was in force in January 1992, and so after this we can concentrate only on the effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs.

The sample covers 14 countries/regions: Australia, China, E.U. (28 countries), India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, U.S., and the rest of the world (RW). Regarding ASEAN, we focus on four countries above (ASEAN4), since the latecomers such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam have their different schedules of tariff reduction in AFTA.⁽⁵⁾ Table 3 summarizes the trade flows in the sample countries/regions in 2013. It shows that the exports of China, Korea, Japan and ASEAN4 to the sample countries/regions except RW occupy more than sixty percent of their exports to the world. Figure 1 describes the trends in the trade flows between ASEAN4 and China, Korea and Japan. It represents rapid two-way trade growth between them, in particular, in China, except in the crisis periods of 1997-98 and 2009.

We then construct panel data for the period between 1993 and 2013 with 14 countries/regions. The trade data are retrieved from RIETI-TID 2013, the database produced by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in Japan.⁽⁶⁾ The GDP and the data for calculating a bilateral real exchange rate, i.e. consumer prices and bilateral nominal exchange rates, are from World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, April 2015, by the International

Monetary Fund.

3.3 Estimation Outcomes and Discussion

Table 4 reports the estimation outcomes of the gravity trade model on the trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs. The main points we observe here are as follows. First, the cumulative coefficients of the FTAC and FTAD dummy variables have expected signs except the cases of trade diversion in the three-lagged AKFTA and of trade creation in AANZFTA and AIFTA: the trade creation effects are significantly positive on trade flows while the trade diversion effects are significantly negative on them. Second, much difference lies in the trade creation effects between in ACFTA and in AKFTA and AJFTA. The trade creation effect in ACFTA, around 0.3, is much larger than those in AKFTA (around 0.1) and AJFTA (less than 0.1). The coefficient, 0.3, suggests that the effect of the presence of a free trade agreement is to increase trade by 35 percent between the country pairs ($e^{0.3}=1.35$). This estimated outcome is also consistent with the previous study of ACFTA trade effects, Yang and Martinez-Zarzoso (2014). Third, trade diversion effects are around -0.05 in ACFTA, AKFTA and AJFTA except the three-lagged AKFTA. Lastly, the coefficient of the bilateral exchange rate is significantly negative as expected in each case.

We interpret the estimation outcomes above in the following ways. Regarding the difference in the trade creation effects between in ACFTA and in AKFTA and AJFTA, we infer the following possible reasons. First, the wider gap between the general tariff rate and the preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in China might create the larger trade creation effect in ACFTA. Since the tariffs in ASEAN seem to be common for China, Korea and Japan under ACFTA, AKFTA and AJFTA, the comparison

Table 3 Summary of Trade Flows in Sample Countries/Regions in 2013

Billion U.S. dollars


Exporter Importer	China	Korea	Japan	ASEAN 4
China		171.5	156.9	145.1
Korea	79.3		59.1	32.5
Japan	169.8	34.0		86.3
ASEAN 4	106.0	35.2	81.5	
Taiwan	41.9	15.6	42.9	21.1
U.S.	421.2	62.1	133.4	74.4
EU(28)	384.8	55.1	85.2	77.5
Australia	42.0	9.4	17.5	25.3
New Zealand	6.3	1.6	2.5	3.7
India	46.1	11.6	10.1	29.6
World	2,047.0	546.3	762.5	772.5

% of exports to the world

Exporter Importer	China	Korea	Japan	ASEAN 4
China		31.4	20.6	18.8
Korea	3.9		7.7	4.2
Japan	8.3	6.2		11.2
ASEAN 4	5.2	6.4	10.7	
Taiwan	2.0	2.9	5.6	2.7
U.S.	20.6	11.4	17.5	9.6
EU(28)	18.8	10.1	11.2	10.0
Australia	2.0	1.7	2.3	3.3
New Zealand	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5
India	2.3	2.1	1.3	3.8
Total /World	63.4	72.5	77.3	64.1

Source: RIETI-TID2013

Figure 1 Trends in Trade Flows between ASEAN4 and Plus-One Countries



Source: RIETI-TID2013

Table 4 Estimation Outcomes on Trade Effects of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ACFTA: Trade Creation				
FTA	0.34*** (3.25)	0.63*** (8.15)	0.63*** (8.14)	0.63*** (8.14)
FTA-1		-0.32*** (-4.74)	0.01*** (81.26)	0.01*** (80.90)
FTA-2			-0.38** (-6.18)	-0.11*** (-80.55)
FTA-3				-0.29*** (-4.78)
Total	0.33	0.31	0.26	0.24
ACFTA: Trade Diversion				
FTA	-0.04 (-1.58)	0.04*** (3.15)	0.04*** (3.14)	0.04 ** (3.08)
FTA-1		-0.10*** (-4.88)	-0.09*** (-118.75)	-0.09*** (-118.27)
FTA-2			0.00 (0.01)	-0.05*** (-10.11)
FTA-3				0.07** (2.49)
Total	-	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03
AKFTA: Trade Creation				
FTA	0.03 (0.43)	-0.26*** (-6.10)	-0.26*** (-6.04)	-0.27*** (-6.47)
FTA-1		0.35*** (8.56)	0.22*** (720.18)	0.22*** (717.15)
FTA-2			0.16*** (4.97)	0.21*** (31.71)
FTA-3				-0.05 (-1.59)
Total	-	0.09	0.12	0.16
AKFTA: Trade Diversion				
FTA	-0.02 (-0.64)	0.04*** (3.15)	0.04*** (3.14)	-0.17*** (-6.23)
FTA-1		-0.10*** (-4.88)	-0.09*** (-118.75)	0.10*** (88.99)
FTA-2			0.00 (0.01)	0.14*** (13.97)
FTA-3				-0.02** (-0.69)
Total	-	-0.06	-0.05	0.05
AJFTA: Trade Creation				
FTA	0.02 (0.46)	-0.10*** (-4.90)	-0.12*** (-5.64)	-0.14*** (-7.16)
FTA-1		0.14*** (4.94)	0.12*** (9.53)	0.13*** (10.56)
FTA-2			0.02 (0.64)	-0.04*** (-352.38)
FTA-3				0.11*** (2.79)
Total	-	0.04	0.00	0.06
AJFTA: Trade Diversion				
FTA	-0.06 (-1.57)	-0.17*** (-5.68)	-0.20*** (-7.52)	-0.22*** (-14.14)
FTA-1		0.11*** (5.52)	0.07*** (3.70)	0.09*** (6.12)
FTA-2			0.04* (1.73)	-0.00*** (-18.07)
FTA-3				0.08*** (3.96)
Total	-	-0.06	-0.09	-0.05
AANZFTA+AIFTA: Trade Creation				
FTA	-0.12*** (-3.30)	-0.14*** (-3.81)	-0.15*** (-3.98)	-0.15*** (-4.07)
AANZFTA+AIFTA: Trade Diversion				
FTA	-0.10** (-2.14)	-0.12*** (-2.65)	-0.13*** (-2.75)	-0.12*** (-2.66)
REX	-0.17*** (-3.55)	-0.17*** (-3.71)	-0.17*** (-3.72)	-0.17*** (-3.69)
Constant	-17.86*** (-79.28)	-17.84*** (-80.32)	-17.83*** (80.26)	-17.84*** (79.90)
Adjusted R ² R	0.8449	0.8451	0.8452	0.8451
No. Observation	3,780	3,780	3,780	3,780

Notes: *t*-statistics are in parentheses. **, ***, denotes statistical significance at 5, and 1 percent level. "Total" is sum of the statistically-significant FTA coefficient estimates.

Source: RIETI-TID2013, and WEO database, April 2015.

of tariff levels should be made in the side of China, Korea and Japan. The general tariff rates can typically be indicated by “Most Favored Nation (MFN) duty rate”. According to the tariff database by World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS)⁽⁷⁾, in 2011, for instance, the average MFN duty rate in China is 11.98 percent and that in Japan is 7.71 percent. On the other hand, the average preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in China under ACFTA is 0.13 percent and that in Japan under AJFTA is 1.32 percent.⁽⁸⁾ Thus, the wider gap in China between general tariff rate, 11.98, and preferential rate, 0.13, compared with that in Japan, might give the greater incentive for ASEAN to export more to China, thereby causing “more trade creation” under ACFTA. It should be also noted that the average level of preferential tariff for ASEAN in China under ACFTA, 0.13, is lower than that in Japan under AJFTA, 1.32, and that the coverage of the products applied for ACFTA in China is also wider than that for AJFTA in Japan.⁽⁹⁾ When we compare the preferential tariff rates for ASEAN under ACFTA and AJFTA by common traded items, the tariff rates under ACFTA are lower than those under AJFTA in all the items, as shown in Table 5. In this situation, the trade creation effect in AJFTA might be offset by more robust one in ACFTA. This situation might be in line with the argument of Fugazza and Nicita (2013): some countries see part of the trade effects provided by improvements in “direct” market access conditions eroded by the deterioration in their “relative” market access conditions. Another background for less trade creation effect in AJFTA is that the bilateral FTAs such as those between Japan and Malaysia and between Japan and Thailand were in force in July 2006 and in November in 2007, respectively, before the enforcement of AJFTA, so that some of the trade creation effect of

AJFTA could be absorbed ahead by those of bilateral FTAs.

As for the trade diversion effects, the negative impacts of ACFTA should be larger since ACFTA in the presence of the “higher” general tariff rate in China might usually produce “more” of trade diversion. The estimated effect of ACFTA is, however, not so large compared with those of AKFTA and AJFTA. One of the speculations is that the imports of China depend more on primary goods than those of Korea and Japan⁽¹⁰⁾, and also that the coverage of the products imported from least developed countries with zero-tariff in China is wider than that in Japan.⁽¹¹⁾ The primary goods imported from developing countries might be insensitive to tariff rates and/or might be under preferential treatment.

4. Concluding Remarks

This article examined the trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model for the recent two decades between 1993 and 2013. The estimation applied the panel-data with fixed effects to clear the FTA-endogeneity problem. The empirics showed that the trade creation effect in ACFTA was much larger than those in AKFTA and AJFTA, and that the trade diversion effects were commonly negative in ACFTA, AKFTA and AJFTA as expected. The larger trade creation effect in ACFTA might come from the wider gap between the general tariff rate and the preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in China.

The implication of the empirics above is that the formation of RCEP is one of the desirable directions to maximize trade creation effect and minimize trade diversion effect. Since the RCEP has a function to merge all the individual

Table 5 Comparison in Tariff Rate for ASEAN under ACFTA and AJFTA

HS 6 digits		China under ACFTA	Japan under AJFTA
702000	Articles of glass > Other articles of glass	0	1.9
710210	Diamonds > Diamonds Unsorted	0	5.4
711510	Other articles of precious metal > Catalysts in the form of wire cloth etc	0	5.7
902300	Instruments, apparatus and models, designed for demonstrational purposes	0	7.6 - 12.7
HS 4 digits			
7101	Pearls, not strung, mounted or set etc	0	5.4
7103	Precious stones and semi-precious stones etc	0	2
7104	Synthetic or reconstructed precious or semi-precious stones etc	0	6.7
7109	Base metals or silver, clad with gold etc	0	2 - 6.7
7114	Articles of goldsmiths' or silversmiths' wares & parts etc	5	5.7
8101	Tungsten (wolfram) and articles thereof, incl. waste and scrap	0	3.8
8105	Cobalt mattes & other intermediate products of cobalt metallurgy etc	0	4.1
8109	Zirconium and articles thereof, incl. waste and scrap	0	0 - 2
8111	Manganese and articles thereof, incl. waste and scrap	0	6.1 - 7.6
9021	Orthopaedic appliances; splints & other fracture appliances etc	0	12.7
9022	Apparatus based on the use of X-rays etc	0	12.7
9024	Machines & appliances for testing the hardness, strength, etc	0	0 - 12.7
9031	Other measuring or checking instruments, appliances & machines etc	0	7.6
9101	Wrist-watches, pocket-watches & other watches etc	0	0 - 4.5
9109	Clock movements, complete and assembled	0	0 - 3.6

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) .

See <https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx>.

ASEAN-plus-one FTAs, it will reduce trade diversion effect at least among plus-one countries such as China, Korea and Japan, and will expand trade creation effect if the preferential tariff rates are unified to the lowest level.

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(1) See WTO webpage:

<http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx>.

(2) Baier and Bergstrand (2007) expressed the past unreliable estimates of FTA treatment effects as

“fragile” estimates by citing Frankel (1997) and Ghosh and Yamarik (2004).

(3) Baier and Bergstrand (2007) conducted the estimation using first-differenced data as well as fixed effects for robustness analysis, and found no significant differences in the estimation outcomes. Thus we herein only focus on the fixed-effect estimation.

(4) Scaling the left-hand-side trade flow by product of GDPs means imposing the restriction of unitary income elasticities. Baier and Bergstrand (2007), however, showed that imposing the unitary income elasticities had no impact on the FTA coefficient estimate.

(5) We also exclude Singapore Brunei due to transit-trading and oil producing country, respectively.

(6) See <http://www.rieti-tid.com/>.

(7) See <https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx>.

(8) The preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in Korea

under AKFTA is not disclosed in the database.

- (9) The number of product codes applied for ACFTA in China is 6,673, while that applied for AJFTA in Japan is 4,312, in 2011, according to WITS database.
- (10) The share of primary goods in total imports in 2013 is 33.6 percent in China, 29.6 in Korea and 29.1 in Japan, respectively, according to RIETI-TID 2013.
- (11) The number of product codes with preferential tariff for least developed countries in China is 4,557, while that in Japan is 3,567, in 2011.

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